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Abstract 
Poterba (1991a) has much influenced the literature on the distributional effects of carbon pricing. The 
gist of Poterba’s study is that the distributional incidence of energy/environmental taxes across 
households is better appreciated if the relative tax burdens are measured against total expenditure 
instead of annual income. Interpreted as a proxy for lifetime income, total expenditure is more stable 
over time. As a result, the incidence of energy price increases is less regressive than when annual 
income is used. This outcome is often taken to lessen the relevance of equity concerns regarding 
carbon pricing. Almost twenty-five years after Poterba (1991a), Piketty (2014) revived the idea that 
wealth is a dimension of economic welfare constituting an increasingly important source of inequality. 
We show that omitting wealth in measuring ability to pay means underestimating the regressivity of 
carbon pricing and its inequity towards younger people. Using household-level data and statistical 
matching, we revisit Poterba’s application and compare the distributional incidence of the US federal 
gasoline tax for different measures of ability to pay: total expenditure, income and wealth-adjusted 
income. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea of taxing fossil fuels in proportion to their carbon content goes back as far as the 1970s, 
when the threat of anthropogenic climate change started to be recognized1. In 1990, Finland was the 
first country to introduce a carbon tax, followed shortly after by the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Norway. Today carbon pricing, whether in the form of carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, is in 
force in several countries, but overall is far from being sufficiently diffuse or deep to significantly 
improve the prospects of climate change. Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been rising 
steadily since the industrial revolution and will continue to do so unless counteracting policies are 
ramped up. In this respect, a change of gear is at last in prospect. An intensification of mitigation 
policies around the world should materialize under the framework recently set out by the Paris 
Agreement 2 . Accordingly, in the next few years carbon pricing is expected to become more 
widespread and deeper than it is currently. 
Most economists favour carbon pricing in that it is a cost-effective approach to reducing GHG 
emissions (Baumol and Oates, 1971). Nevertheless, carbon pricing in the real world is not popular or 
easy to implement. For carbon pricing to be politically sustainable, its side effects need to be 
effectively managed3. By raising the cost of energy, unilateral carbon pricing can be detrimental to the 
international competitiveness of domestic energy-intensive firms. At the same time, inasmuch as 
energy goods are a necessity in households’ consumption4, carbon pricing tends to affect the poor 
more than the wealthy in relative terms. That is, it tends to be regressive. The revenues generated by 
carbon pricing, be they the yield of a carbon tax or of the auctions of emission allowances under a 
cap-and-trade system, could be used to at least partially offset these undesirable effects. Though this is 
easier said than done5, the deeper the level of carbon pricing, the more critical it is that both the 
competitiveness and distributional issues are properly addressed. 
This paper offers a new perspective and new empirical evidence on the distributional incidence 
of gasoline taxes and, by extension, of carbon pricing across households. Specifically, it fills a gap in 
the literature by considering wealth as a dimension of economic welfare additional to income. This 
innovation provides us with a more accurate representation of reality, in which the wealth owned by a 
person, or a household, contributes to her ability to pay (taxes). In this sense, ignoring wealth is an 
omission that alters the portrait of distributional effects, as wealth is both more concentrated than 
                                                            
1
 See, for example, the early contributions of Nordhaus (1977a, 1977b), among the first proponents of carbon 
taxation. 
2
 The Paris Agreement is the international agreement, under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, dealing with climate mitigation, adaptation and finance, starting in the year 2020. 
3
 Moreover, a growing literature deals with the public’s cognitive difficulties and worldviews that hinder its 
adoption. Drews and van den Bergh (2015) provide a comprehensive literature review on the determinants of 
public support for climate policies. 
4
 In the developed economies, the income elasticity of energy demand is typically smaller than 1. 
5
 Earmarking is somewhat infrequent and unpopular among economists, as it generally means foregoing 
alternative more efficient uses of the revenues. 
income and imperfectly correlated with income. This issue appears to be increasingly relevant in light 
of Thomas Piketty’s warning, in his Capital in the twenty-first century (Piketty, 2014), that wealth 
concentrations have been rising and may well continue to rise unless corrective policies are 
undertaken.  
While taking wealth into account is generally desirable for the completeness of any equity 
assessment, it is particularly opportune in relation to carbon pricing. This is the case for different 
reasons. First, carbon pricing without a redistributive mechanism linked to it effectively amounts to 
financing a public good, namely climate stability, through regressive taxation. Consequently, it often 
encounters strong resistance motivated by equity concerns. Second, the need to reduce GHG 
emissions and the related commitment of the Paris Agreement, suggest that carbon pricing will 
become deeper in the near future. Third, following James Poterba’s work in this field (1989, 1991a, 
1991b), a significant proportion of the literature concludes by playing down the relevance of the 
distributional effects of carbon pricing. This outcome stems from specific methodological choices, 
notably that of considering (expected) lifetime ability to pay instead of (observable) current ability to 
pay. 
Using household-level data from the 2012 round of the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) 
and from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), we revisit Poterba’s 1991 seminal paper “Is 
the gasoline tax regressive?” (Poterba, 1991a). Poterba’s analysis is extended, empirically, by 
imputing observed wealth in the SCF to households in the CE and, theoretically, by considering 
wealth as one dimension of economic welfare and, hence, as a complementary measure of ability to 
pay. Based on annual gasoline expenditure, we estimate the economic burden of the federal gasoline 
tax ($0.184/gallon) relative to three alternative measures of ability to pay: a) annual total expenditure, 
as a proxy for lifetime income (Poterba’s approach), b) annual income and c) annual wealth-adjusted 
income, which is annual income augmented with a wealth annuity. The analysis of the results consists 
in the comparison of the three measurements of the relative tax burdens, first, across the respective 
distributions of ability to pay measures and, then, across the distribution of the head of household’s 
age. The correlation between wealth and age, due to the first accumulating over time, indeed implies 
that the distributional incidence of carbon pricing across age groups changes depending on whether 
wealth is considered. Considerations about intergenerational equity are relevant to climate policy 
given the difference between the young and the elderly in both the responsibilities for causing climate 
change and the related costs faced in prospect. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
explains why wealth should be considered in this context. Section 4 derives and compares the 
distributional incidence of the US federal gasoline tax according to alternative measures of ability to 
pay. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
The connections between gasoline taxation and carbon pricing are such that our analysis while dealing 
with the former can also be relevant to the latter. Focusing on gasoline taxes simplifies the analysis in 
terms of data, methodology and assumptions, while being sufficient to identify the role of wealth in 
the equity assessment of any policies affecting energy prices.  
Aside from the substitution between motor fuels with different carbon content (principally 
gasoline and auto diesel), studying the economic effects of gasoline taxes is effectively equivalent to 
studying the effects of carbon pricing in the road transportation sector. A second connection between 
gasoline taxes and carbon pricing concerns the relative degree of regressivity. Price increases in motor 
fuels are typically less regressive than price increases in home fuels (principally electricity and natural 
gas), as the demand for the first is more income elastic than that for the second (e.g., Barker and 
Köhler, 1998; Tiezzi, 2005; Callan et al., 2009; Ekins et al., 2011; Hassett et al., 2012; Kosonen, 
2014; Flues and Thomas, 2015; Verde and Pazienza, 2016). As a result, gasoline taxes are usually less 
regressive than carbon pricing when this is operating in other sectors of the economy, notably 
electricity generation and the residential sector. 
The following literature review focuses on the methodological aspects most relevant to our 
analysis. It first covers the empirical studies on gasoline taxes and, subsequently, those on carbon 
pricing. 
 
2.1 The distributional incidence of gasoline taxes 
The empirical literature on the distributional incidence of gasoline taxes largely uses household 
survey data to estimate tax burdens or welfare effects across income levels or socio-demographic 
characteristics. The frameworks used are either static or allow for demand response to price changes, 
often within demand system models estimated under separable utility assumptions. In the applications 
to developed economies, gasoline taxes are found to be regressive to varying degrees or 
approximately proportional, in this case often with middle-income households bearing the heaviest 
burdens6. Importantly, however, the results are not independent from the choices made concerning the 
methodology. As noted by Sterner (2012a), at least two types of choice can affect the distributional 
outcome significantly. One concerns the inclusion or exclusion of the households that do not own any 
vehicles. Since most of these households are at the bottom of the income distribution, their inclusion 
(exclusion) in the calculations results in a less (more) regressive outcome. The second choice 
concerns the variable measuring the ability to pay or, rather, the time horizon over which the ability to 
pay is valued. This is typically the present or, in an ex-ante perspective, a person’s lifetime. The 
longer the time horizon, the less variable is the distribution of economic welfare, due to both earnings 
patterns over time and income mobility, so gasoline taxes are less regressive over a lifetime. For a 
                                                            
6
 In developing economies, gasoline taxes are generally progressive (Sterner, 2012a). 
number of countries, Sterner (2012b) contrasts the different distributional incidence of the same 
gasoline taxes obtained using the current ability to pay approach and the lifetime approach. 
The present paper deals with the implications of the second choice above. In addressing this 
question, we are not the first to take a critical stance: Chernick and Reschovsky (1992, 1997, 2000) 
were the first, but also the last as far as we are aware. They brought arguments and evidence that 
fundamentally question James Poterba’s lifetime approach to estimating the distributional incidence 
of gasoline taxes (Poterba, 1991a) and carbon taxes (Poterba, 1991b). Poterba’s approach, which leads 
to the conclusion that these taxes are not regressive over a lifetime, consists in the use of current total 
expenditure as a proxy for lifetime income and, therefore, as a measure of lifetime ability to pay. 
Chernick and Reschovsky point out that this approach, which emanates from Milton Friedman’s 
permanent income theory of consumption (Friedman, 1957) and the companion life-cycle model of 
saving (Ando and Modigliani, 1963), rests on a set of very strong assumptions, namely: a) income 
mobility is very high; b) gasoline consumption decisions are made on the basis of lifetime income; 
and c) total consumption is a constant fraction of lifetime income. Using longitudinal data, they test 
Poterba’s results by deriving the incidence of the US gasoline tax over an 11-year period, finding that 
the gasoline tax burdens are in fact only slightly less regressive than annual burdens. The authors 
emphasize that the main reason for the similarity of annual and intermediate-run burdens is the limited 
degree of income mobility.  
In spite of Chernick and Reschovsky’s analysis and findings, many subsequent studies assess 
the distributional incidence of gasoline taxes and carbon taxes using Poterba’s lifetime approach. 
Only few take the lifetime perspective while applying more sophisticated approaches than Poterba’s, 
including notably Fullerton and Rogers (1993) and Bull et al. (1994). Both the frequent lack of 
income data (or of sufficiently good quality income data) in household surveys and its computational 
simplicity, may at least partly explain the fortune of Poterba’s approach as reflected in the number of 
its followers. 
 
2.2 The distributional incidence of carbon pricing 
The literature on the distributional effects of carbon pricing is methodologically more diverse than 
that on gasoline taxes. This is the case because carbon pricing can cover an area of the economy that 
is broader than the transportation sector. Accordingly, economy-wide models are often used: usually 
either computable general equilibrium (CGE) models or macroeconometric models (occasionally 
combined with microsimulation models). The advantage of using these models for distributional 
analysis is that secondary and general equilibrium effects are taken into account. The CGE literature, 
in particular, stresses the capability of these models to capture the distributional effects of carbon 
pricing occurring through both the uses side of income, i.e. consumption and savings, as well as the 
sources side of income, i.e. the returns to labour, capital and the other primary factors. The 
distributional incidence of carbon pricing is thus given by the sum of the effects unfolding over the 
two sides of income, which in turn depend on the use of the revenues generated by carbon pricing 
(“revenue recycling”) and the (related) impact on the economy. Over time, progressive sources-of-
income effects may partially or even entirely offset the regressive uses-of-income effects typically 
captured by partial equilibrium models. Rausch et al. (2011) and Dissou and Siddiqui (2015) illustrate 
this type of CGE result.  
The CGE literature also stresses the efficiency-equity trade-off between alternative uses of the 
revenues generated by carbon pricing. Namely, the redistributive options tackle the regressive 
distributional effects, but not the efficiency loss of the economy due to carbon pricing. Vice versa, 
through the reduction of distortionary taxes, typically on labour or capital, the efficiency revenue 
recycling options tackle the economy’s efficiency loss, but not the distributional effects. This trade-off 
relates to our analysis in that underestimating regressivity makes efficiency-enhancing tax cuts unduly 
more attractive relative to the redistributive alternatives.  
 
 
3. Why considering wealth 
In official statistics, annual income is the standard measure of ability to pay used to determine the 
degree of tax progressivity or regressivity. However, we have just seen that alternative measures of 
ability to pay are considered in the empirical literature. Notably, estimated lifetime income measuring 
lifetime ability to pay is often used to determine the lifetime distributional incidence of gasoline taxes 
or carbon pricing. Fullerton and Rogers (1991), who are among the most prominent proponents of the 
lifetime perspective, argue that policymakers should be concerned with “short run equity” as well as 
“long run equity”: “the fairness of a tax should be evaluated both on how current taxes reflect current 
ability to pay and on how lifetime taxes reflect lifetime ability to pay”. 
The central argument of the present paper is that considering wealth as a complementary 
measure of ability to pay constitutes an improvement on the use of sole annual income and, all the 
more so, of lifetime income. In contrast with Fullerton and Rogers’ point above, short run equity and 
long run equity are not equivalent or equally relevant. The two concepts fundamentally differ in that 
the first is observable while the second can only be predicted. As far as equity judgments are 
concerned, realised outcomes matter, while predicted outcomes do not matter as much. Second, the 
lifetime perspective necessarily rests on a set of assumptions which affect the reliability of the results. 
Nonetheless, the lifetime results are often presented as lessening the relevance of equity concerns 
regarding carbon pricing (e.g., Hassett et al., 2009; Sterner, 2012a, 2012b; Kosonen, 2014; Mathur 
and Morris, 2014; Parry, 2015; Williams, 2016). This takes us a step away from the reality of the 
equity problem. There is in fact greater urgency for the measurement of ability to pay to be extended 
“in perimeter”, by considering wealth, rather than in time, as with the lifetime perspective. The 
present section elaborates on these points. 
 3.1 Ex post equity versus ex ante equity (or short run equity versus long run equity)  
The lifetime perspective in evaluating the distributional incidence of gasoline taxes and carbon 
pricing, and of all taxes in general, implies that interpersonal comparisons are based on expected 
lifetime ability to pay as opposed to observed current ability to pay. Yet, because expectations may 
obviously not be what occurs, people normally make equity judgments based on observed welfare 
differentials. For the same reason, welfare programs are calibrated based on observed welfare 
differentials, not expected ones. As Warren (1980) points out, expectations are central to the 
economic theory concerned with the making of rational choices ex ante; but fairness in taxation 
should depend – and indeed does depend, in the real world – on outcomes, not expectations. 
We thus find the lifetime studies of interest for the analytical insights that they offer, but not as 
much for the utility of the related policy implications. By contrast, considering wealth in measuring 
current ability to pay is an innovation that provides us with a better representation of reality. This is 
because wealth is a dimension of economic welfare (see below) and people internalize observed 
wealth differentials (just like income or consumption differentials) in making equity judgments. 
Nevertheless, as it stands, the literature on the distributional incidence of gasoline taxes and carbon 
pricing ignores wealth altogether.  
 
3.2 Wealth as a dimension of economic welfare 
Which, among income, consumption and wealth, should be targeted by direct taxation is a question 
long debated by economists. The matter is complex because it relates to philosophical views as well 
as both economic and practical considerations. Related to this question, there now seems to be general 
agreement that income, consumption and wealth capture different dimensions of a person’s economic 
welfare. The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, a.k.a. 
the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (SSF) Commission, recommended in its final report that income, 
consumption and wealth be considered together to measure economic welfare and, therefore, to 
measure ability to pay (Stiglitz et al., 2009). In the same document, the use of the three indicators is 
explained as follows: 
 
“Income flows are an important gauge for the standard of living, but in the end it is consumption and 
consumption possibilities over time that matter. The time dimension brings in wealth. A low-income 
household with above-average wealth is better off than a low income household without wealth. The 
existence of wealth is also one reason why income and consumption are not necessarily equal: for a 
given income, consumption can be raised by running down assets or by increasing debt, and 
consumption can be reduced by saving and adding to assets. For this reason, wealth is an important 
indicator of the sustainability of actual consumption.”  
 
About forty-years before the SFF Commission, Weisbrod and Hansen (1968) were the first to 
study the implications of considering wealth (or net worth) as a store of potential consumption and, 
therefore, of economic welfare. The authors devised a method whereby income and wealth are 
combined into a single indicator of economic welfare. They then explored the implications of using 
the income-wealth indicator (“wealth-adjusted income”, as we call it below) for the assessment of 
economic inequality, including tax progressivity and regressivity, and for the prediction of 
consumption behaviour. The key element of the authors’ analysis is the imperfect correlation between 
income and wealth, which means that households’ welfare ranking is different depending on whether 
income or the income-wealth indicator is used. Weisbrod and Hansen’s income-wealth indicator was 
refined and integrated in the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-being (LIMEW) (Wolff et al., 
2007), from which our application below borrows some methodological aspects.  
 
3.3 Wealth inequality and carbon pricing: “the elephant in the room” 
It is a well-known fact that the distribution of income and the distribution of wealth differ 
significantly, the latter being more concentrated than the former. In Capital in the twenty-first century, 
Piketty (2014) examines the evolution of the two distributions, primarily in Europe and in the US, 
since before the nineteenth century. While wealth concentrations are much lower today than at the 
peak, in the years preceding World War I, one of Piketty’s main conclusions is that very high wealth 
concentrations may characterise the economy of the twenty-first century. The last four decades have 
indeed seen a positive trend in wealth concentrations over time, especially in the US, which may well 
continue if certain conditions persist. In this context, taking wealth into account – to evaluate people’s 
welfare and to address distributional issues – is all the more desirable. Yet, to date annual income 
remains the only measure used for such purposes.  
The utility of considering wealth is general, in the sense that it would benefit any type of 
assessment concerning economic equity. However, we deem it to be particularly relevant for 
appreciating and, thereby, for dealing with the opposition to carbon pricing motivated by equity 
concerns. First, one needs to recall that the ultimate purpose of carbon pricing is to maintain a stable 
climate, which is a (global) public good. Second, everyone supports public goods as long as their cost 
is shared in a way that is perceived as fair. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that no opposition would 
arise to a public good being financed through regressive taxation. Though never clearly 
acknowledged, as far as we are aware, carbon pricing without a redistributive mechanism linked to it 
effectively corresponds to this type of setting 7. Considering wealth in evaluating economic welfare is 
therefore all the more desirable in relation to carbon pricing. Adapting a figurative expression, if 
wealth is the elephant in the room that somehow goes unnoticed, carbon pricing as a public good 
problem makes the room smaller: so the elephant is even bigger in relative terms. 
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 The provision of public goods is usually financed through the general tax system, which in the modern fiscal 
state is not regressive. 
4. The distributional incidence of the US gasoline tax 
In the US, three tax layers apply to the consumption of gasoline and auto diesel, namely, federal taxes, 
State taxes and local taxes. The federal tax rate on gasoline is currently 0.184 $/gallon and has not 
changed since 2006. The federal tax rate on auto diesel is 0.244 $/gallon. State and local taxes can 
differ significantly across the country and, as compared with the federal taxes, are more frequently 
subject to revisions. In recent years, growing concerns related to declining fiscal revenues and high 
CO2 emissions meant that the option of raising gasoline taxes has received increasing consideration in 
the public policy debate. However, raising gasoline taxes is still anything but a popular measure, all 
the more so in an economy heavily dependent on private transportation. 
Using data referring to the year 2012, we derive the distributional incidence of the US federal 
gasoline tax across households. The purpose of the analysis is to show the implications of using 
different ability to pay measures for the resulting distributional incidence. Bringing in wealth as a 
measure of ability to pay complementary to income is our contribution to the literature, which results 
in a more accurate rendering of the distributional incidence. The first part of this section is devoted to 
a) the data work for imputing wealth to the households in our sample and b) the assumptions made for 
determining wealth-adjusted income. The second part deals with the differences in distribution 
between the alternative ability to pay measures. The third part examines the respective differences in 
distributional incidence both across welfare levels and the head of household’s age. 
 
4.1 Data 
Our analysis is based on household-level data from the 2012 round of the US Consumption 
Expenditure Survey (CE). Our sample consists of 2,179 households, those for whom annual 
expenditure could be derived8. Developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the CE is the most 
comprehensive data source on US households’ consumption choices, including information on 
expenditure, income and socio-demographics9. The CE serves well the purpose of our study, as is the 
case for most of the closely related US literature.  
Crucially, however, the CE does not contain information (or, rather, not sufficiently accurate 
information) on households’ wealth. To overcome this limitation, we use statistical matching (aka 
data fusion) whereby household-level information on wealth is imported from the US Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) into our CE sample. After performing the statistical matching, we follow 
Wolff et al. (2005, 2007) and Wolff and Zacharias (2009) in developing an indicator of economic 
well-being which aptly combines households’ income and wealth. This indicator, measuring what is 
hereafter referred to as wealth-adjusted income, allows us to assess the distributional incidence of the 
gasoline tax taking the wealth dimension of a household’s ability to pay into account. The three 
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 In the 2012 round of the CE, this is the number of households with four quarterly interviews. 
9
 The BLS uses the CE to periodically revise the expenditure weights of the Consumer Price Index.  
measures of ability to pay, namely income, total expenditure and wealth-adjusted income, are flow 
variables directly comparable to one another. 
 
4.1.1 Statistical matching  
The purpose of statistical matching is to obtain joint information on the not jointly observed variables 
(D’Orazio et al., 2006). The most common setting is that of two surveys drawn from the same 
population and sharing a set of common variables, X, typically socio-demographic variables, but not 
other variables, Y and Z, whose relationship is of interest. In practice, we use statistical matching to 
assign specific households’ observed wealth in the SCF sample to the households in our CE sample. 
The imputation of wealth is based on the relationships between the common variables (X) and both 
wealth (Y) and gasoline expenditure (Z). The resulting fused dataset is the initial CE sample (which 
includes information on gasoline expenditure) augmented with imputed wealth. 
After harmonizing the variables shared by the two surveys, only those with similar empirical 
distributions in the two datasets and, also, statistically associated with both wealth and gasoline 
expenditure in the donor and recipient datasets, respectively, are selected as matching variables 
(D’Orazio et al., 2006). These turn out to be the following: household income, housing tenure, age of 
the reference person, her education level, her marital status and her employer type. Propensity score 
matching (Rässler, 2002) is then used to assign observed wealth in the SCF to each household in the 
CE dataset. Propensity scores are derived based on the matching variables above and the Mahalonobis 
distance function is applied to pair households across the two datasets. The resulting fused dataset 
satisfactorily meets the standard validity requirements of statistical matching (Rässler, 2002, 2004). 
More details on the matching procedure are provided in Section A of the Appendix. 
 
4.1.2 Measuring wealth-adjusted income 
Annual income is the sum of labour income (wages and salaries) and property income (interests, 
dividends and rents). Wealth is, by contrast, a stock variable, here defined as “net worth”: the current 
value of all marketable or fungible assets less the current value of all debts. Following Wolff and 
Zacharias (2009), we consider only assets that can be readily converted to cash, and so converted into 
potential consumption, without compromising current consumption. Accordingly, consumer durable 
goods, future social security benefits and future retirement benefits from defined-benefit private 
pensions are not included. To combine wealth and income into a single ability to pay measure, wealth 
as just defined needs to be converted into a flow variable. It is converted into a stream of constant 
annual payments (annuities) covering the expected remaining life of the head of household or of the 
younger spouse if there is one10. Basically, wealth is spread evenly over time such that its stock is 
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 Together with age, we take into account gender differences in life expectancy. Life expectancy estimates are 
taken from Arias (2015).  
exhausted at the end of the given expected lifetime. Wealth-adjusted income is then the sum of annual 
income and a single wealth annuity.  
The wealth annuities have two main components corresponding to home and non-home assets. 
The first component is an imputed rent for owner-occupied housing. The second is derived based on a 
weighted average of historical rates of return on different types of assets. Table 1 shows summary 
statistics of households’ (imputed) assets and liabilities per adult equivalent11 in the fused dataset12.  
 
Table 1 – Net worth (per adult equivalent) and its composition. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean share 
of Net worth 
Ownership 
ratesa 
Net worth 217,293 413,973 -242,446 3,446,505 100% 100% 
Assets       
Owner-occupied housing 108,533 151,996 0 2,500,000 50% 70% 
Real estate and business 49,184 203,522 -78,000 2,894,000 23% 28% 
Liquid assets 23,510 59,821 0 815,000 11% 94% 
Financial assets 27,502 113,193 0 1,764,000 13% 33% 
Retirement assets 54,562 149,937 0 2,123,001 25% 50% 
Debts       
Mortgage debt 37,897 69,116 0 890,666 17% 44% 
Other debt  8,103 19,928 0 450,000 4% 61% 
a.: Percentage of households owning the asset. 
 
Housing is a universal need and home ownership frees the owner from the obligation of paying 
a rent, leaving an equivalent amount of financial resources for other uses. The rent imputed to the 
households owning their home is calculated by multiplying the value of the given dwelling by the US 
ratio of (imputed) rent-to-home value for owner-occupied homes. Formally, the imputed rent of 
household i is IRi = hi *(IR/H), where hi is the value of the dwelling, while IR and H are the country-
level sums of the imputed rents and values, respectively, of owner-occupied homes13. The 2012 US 
rent-to-home ratio (IR/H) is 5.7% and, on average, IRi makes up 8.9% of wealth-adjusted income 
(Table 2). 
The non-home component of the wealth annuity is derived by updating and applying the return 
rates used by Wolff and Zacharias (2009) (see Table B1, in the Appendix). We use average return 
rates calculated over the period 1972-201214. As these rates already include both capital gains and any 
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 The new OECD equivalence scale is used, in which the head of household weighs 1, all other household 
members aged over 13 weigh 0.5 each, and those under 14 weigh 0.3 each. 
12
 Sampling weights are applied in all the calculations presented in this paper (including summary statistics). 
13
 The 2012 value of IR is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table 7.12, Line 154 (Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, 2015). The 2012 value of H is taken from the Federal Reserve’s (2012) Flow of Funds 
Accounts. 
14
 The data on return rates are from the Federal Reserve’s (2012) Flow of Funds Accounts (see Appendix C). 
income the assets may generate, property income is subtracted from household annual income to 
avoid double counting. 
 
Table 2 – Composition of wealth-adjusted income. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Income 79.1% 22.8 84.3% 
Property income -1.3% 9.8 -0.0% 
Wealth annuity 22.1% 21.5 16.4% 
    Non-home wealth annuity 13.1% 18.0 5.2% 
    Home-wealth annuity 8.9% 10.5 6.9% 
 
 
4.2 Differences between the distributions of alternative ability to pay measures 
For a household, or an individual, the relative burden of the gasoline tax is given by the tax payment 
embedded in her gasoline expenditure relative to her ability to pay. In the literature, the denominator 
of this ratio is either annual income or annual total expenditure as a proxy for lifetime income. We 
consider wealth as an additional dimension of economic welfare. Since wealth is a stock variable, 
while both income and total expenditure are flows, wealth-adjusted income (rather than wealth) is the 
third alternative measure of ability to pay directly comparable to the others. The distribution of the 
relative tax burden across households is clearly dependent on that of the variable at the denominator: 
the more uneven (dispersed) the distribution of the ability to pay measure, the more uneven the 
distribution of the relative tax burden too. Moreover, to the extent that the different measures of 
ability to pay are imperfectly correlated with one another, the ranking of households by tax burden 
will also depend on which measure of ability to pay is used. 
 
4.2.1 Differences in distribution and households’ ranking 
With reference to the fused dataset, Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the sample distributions of 
a) annual income, b) annual total expenditure, c) wealth and d) wealth-adjusted income, all of which 
are expressed in per adult equivalent terms. While the median of total expenditure is not much smaller 
than that of income, the distance widens for the upper parts of the two distributions, as one would 
expect. The distribution of wealth exhibits negative values up to around the 10th percentile, it becomes 
positive and rapidly increases thereafter.  
The skewness statistics indicate that the distribution of wealth is the most asymmetric, as being more 
positively skewed than those of income and especially of total expenditure. The kurtosis statistics tell 
us that the distribution of wealth is also that with the heaviest tails (relative to the rest of the 
distribution). We can then deduce that the wealth distribution has a longer right tale. This is reflected 
in the higher concentration of wealth as measured by the Gini coefficient and pictured in Figure 1. 
 
 Table 3 – Distributions of Net worth and ability to pay measures (per adult equivalent). 
 Net worth Income Total 
expenditure 
Wealth-adj. 
income 
1st percentile -45,740 1,629 6,538 3,016 
5th percentile -14,497 7,064 9,739 8,382 
10th percentile -5,252 10,000 11,636 11,764 
25th percentile 967 17,680 17,045 22,314 
50th percentile 57,666 31,481 26,416 42,110 
75th percentile 241,866 53,199 39,569 77,375 
90th percentile 617,200 85,833 56,644 134,699 
95th percentile 1,035,670 110,528 71,688 192,688 
99th percentile 2,033,803 213,486 111,197 320,233 
Mean 217,293 42,392 31,613 61,356 
Std. Dev. 413,937 39,594 21,167 62,166 
CV 1.91 0.93 0.67 1.01 
Kurtosis 18.66 14.16 11.27 11.31 
Skewness 3.50 2.74 2.15 2.49 
Gini coefficient 0.76 0.44 0.34 0.47 
 
 
As the Gini indices show, despite wealth being highly concentrated, wealth-adjusted income is 
only slightly more concentrated than income. Wolff et al. (2009) explain that there are two reasons for 
the small difference, in terms of concentration, between the two variables. First, household income 
and wealth are not perfectly correlated, so that there are households with low income but high wealth 
and also with high income but low wealth. Second, the annuity payments are limited in size relative to 
annual income, the former making up on average 22% of the latter (Table 2). As a result, the inclusion 
of wealth annuities in augmented income does not alter the overall distribution of income very much.  
In principle, alternative ability to pay measures may have equally shaped distributions but 
entirely different ranking of the statistical units, which are households in our case. In general, the 
weaker is the correlation between the two variables, the greater is this type of mismatch. Table 4 
illustrates the frequency of these changes in households’ ranking when switching from one measure of 
ability to pay to another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Lorenz curves of ability-to-pay measures. 
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For each of the five pairs of distributions, the rows indicate the shares of total households falling in 
the same quintiles of the two distributions (in which case the quintile change is equal to 0) or in 
quintiles that are one to four quintiles apart (in which case the quintile change ranges between -1 and -
4 and between +1 and +4). In the first column, the comparison of income vs total expenditure shows 
that only 46% of all households are equally positioned in the two distributions. The negative values (-
1 to -4) correspond to the households that are relatively richer in total expenditure than in income: 
they add up to 25% of all households; and vice versa for the positive values (1 to 4). The mismatch is 
slightly more frequent in the comparison of total expenditure vs wealth-adjusted income (second 
column), while it is clearly less frequent in that of income vs wealth-adjusted income (third column)15.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15
 The mismatch is much more pronounced in the comparisons of both total expenditure and income vs wealth 
(fourth and fifth column, respectively). 
Table 4 – Frequency of changes in quintile ranking (%). 
Change in 
quintile 
Income 
vs 
Tot. exp. 
Tot. exp. 
vs 
Wealth-adj. 
income 
Income 
vs 
Wealth-adj. 
income 
Tot. exp. 
vs 
Net worth 
Income 
vs 
Net worth 
-4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 
-3 2.0 1.7 0.8 4.1 3.7 
-2 5.6 5.2 2.1 10.9 9.7 
-1 16.7 20.3 10.7 20.3 20.0 
0 46.3 45.2 67.2 30.6 32.2 
1 23.0 19.6 18.6 17.3 18.9 
2 5.2 5.7 0.2 9.7 8.4 
3 0.6 1.6 0.1 4.1 4.3 
4 0.1 0.4 0.0 2.2 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Correlation 0.72 0.66 0.88 0.34 0.42 
  
 
4.2.2 Differences across age groups 
For the simple reason that people accumulate wealth over time, taking wealth into account in 
determining ability to pay has a disequalizing effect over households’ age dimension. To examine this 
aspect, we have partitioned our sample into seven groups according to the age of the head of 
household (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 – Frequency distribution of households by head of household's age. 
Age group < 25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 > 74 
Frequency (%) 3.5 13.0 17.2 20.7 20.0 14.4 11.3 
 
 
The top graph in Figure 2 shows median wealth per adult equivalent by the head of household’s 
age group. The pattern of median wealth across age groups is very clear. The wealth owned by the 
median household in the top age group, 75-89 years old, is about ten times that of the median 
household in the 35-44 year-old group. The difference is even more striking if the comparison is made 
with the two youngest groups; or if cumulated wealth over the three oldest groups is compared with 
that of the three youngest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Wealth and ability to pay measures by head of household’s age group. 
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The bottom graph in the same Figure shows the median values of the different ability to pay 
measures – income, total expenditure and wealth-adjusted income – by age group. When contrasting 
income and total expenditure, the most significant differences between the two are observed for the 
45-54 and the 55-64 mid groups. The pattern of wealth-adjusted income is such that the difference of 
income or total expenditure tends to widen with the head of household’s age. Thus, while for the 
youngest households, whether income, total expenditure or wealth-adjusted income is considered does 
not make much of a difference in absolute terms, it does make a difference for the more mature 
households. For these households, substantially higher levels of wealth-adjusted income relative to 
income or total expenditure mean that their ability to pay is significantly underestimated when using 
one of the two latter measures. Moreover, due again to the highly uneven distribution of wealth across 
age, ranking effects correlated with age stem from the inclusion of wealth in the measurement of 
ability to pay (see Figure C1, in the Appendix).  
 
4.3 The distributional incidence of the gasoline tax by ability to pay measure 
We now turn to examining the distributional incidence of the gasoline tax according to the measuring 
of ability to pay.  We first focus on tax regressivity, which concerns the distributional incidence of the 
tax across levels of ability to pay. We then consider the distributional incidence of the gasoline tax 
across age groups. 
 
4.3.1 The degree of tax regressivity 
For a person or a household, the relative burden of a commodity tax is given by the ratio between the 
tax payment implicit in her consumption of the good and her ability to pay. The distribution of these 
burdens across levels of ability to pay determines the degree of regressivity, or progressivity, of the 
tax. If the tax under study is one already in force, as opposed to a hypothetical new tax or a tax 
increase (in these cases allowing for demand response is relevant), its degree of regressivity is very 
well proxied by the distribution of the ratio between expenditure on the given good and ability to pay. 
The graphs in Figure 3 show median gasoline expenditure as a proportion of the different ability to 
pay measures, by decile (of the corresponding variable measuring ability to pay). 
 
Figure 3 – Gasoline expenditure as a share of alternative ability to pay measures. 
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The median burden of the first decile is clearly highest (11.3%) when ability to pay is measured by 
income (A graph). The steep decline of the median burden across the income deciles suggests that the 
gasoline tax is highly regressive. The same conclusion applies when ability to pay is measured by 
wealth-adjusted income (C graph), but a more rigorous assessment will allow us to ascertain which of 
the two measures results in a more regressive outcome (see below). By contrast, the distributional 
incidence of the gasoline tax appears to be significantly less regressive when ability to pay is 
measured by total expenditure (B graph). As in most of the studies that use total expenditure as a 
proxy for lifetime income, the gasoline tax is found to be progressive over the lower part of the total 
expenditure distribution and then to turn to regressive over the better-off deciles. 
To quantify the degree of tax regressivity for the three alternative measures of ability to pay, we 
calculate the Suits index (Suits, 1977). To do this, we first derive each household’s tax payment by 
dividing gasoline expenditure by the relevant average gasoline price16, 17. Analogous to the Gini index 
for its geometrical derivation, the Suits index, S, can take any value between +1 and -1, which 
correspond to the limiting cases of progressivity (the wealthiest bear the entire tax burden) and 
regressivity (the poorest bear the entire tax burden), respectively, and is equal to 0 in the case of 
perfect proportionality. Let y be the cumulative share of overall income, or total expenditure or 
wealth-adjusted income, and T the cumulative share of overall tax payments, 
5000
11 ∫−=−=
100
0
T(y)dy
K
LS  (1) 
where L is the area under the Lorenz curve and K the area under the 45-degree line of proportionality 
( 5000
2
100100 =× ). 
We find: 29.0−=IS , 15.0−=CS  and 36.0−=WIS , for income (I), total expenditure (C) 
and wealth-adjusted income (WI), respectively. The graph in Figure 4 contrasts the three Lorenz 
curves. 
 
Figure 4 – Lorenz curve for the US gasoline tax, by ability to pay measure. 
 
 
                                                            
16
 We use monthly US average tax-inclusive gasoline prices published by the US Energy Information 
Administration.  
17
 Figure C2, in the Appendix, shows the median tax payment as a proportion of the alternative ability to pay 
measures, by decile.  
Thus, the gasoline tax turns out to be more regressive if ability to pay is measured by wealth-adjusted 
income than if the same is measured by income. The difference is substantial, as it represents a 24% 
increase in regressivity. What is more, the difference is rather sizable, representing a 140% increase in 
regressivity, if the comparison is made with the outcome resulting from using total expenditure in the 
lifetime perspective.  
 
4.3.2 The incidence of the tax across age groups 
On average, households with a young or an elderly head of household consume less gasoline than 
those with a middle-aged head of household (see Figure C3, in the Appendix). At the same time, 
households of the latter type tend to exhibit greater ability to pay (Figure 2 above). However, we here 
examine how the incidence of the gasoline tax varies across age groups, depending on the measure of 
ability to pay alone.  
 
Figure 5 – Tax burdens as shares of alternative ability to pay measures, by head of household’s age. 
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Figure 5 shows the relative tax burdens across age groups, by measure of ability to pay. The 
disequalizing effect of using total expenditure instead of income turns out to be somewhat limited. By 
contrast, when using wealth-adjusted income instead of income, (on average) older age groups 
systematically bear lower burdens than younger ones. This means that, in relative terms, the burdens 
borne by older (younger) households are overestimated (underestimated) if wealth is not considered in 
measuring ability to pay. 
5. Conclusions 
The literature on the distributional incidence of gasoline taxes, as well as of carbon pricing, ignores 
wealth as a dimension of economic welfare and, thus, as a component of ability to pay. With reference 
to the US gasoline tax, we show that this is an important omission, which results in a significant 
underestimation of both the regressivity of the tax and its inequity towards younger people. Taking 
wealth into account exacerbates the regressivity outcome because the distribution of wealth is much 
more concentrated than that of income, which is the standard measure of current ability to pay, and all 
the more so of total expenditure, often used as a proxy for lifetime ability to pay. Taking wealth into 
account also reveals that, in relative terms, younger people actually bear greater tax burdens than 
those resulting from using income or total expenditure as measures of ability to pay. This is the case 
because, on average, older people own more wealth. 
These findings are relevant in light of the opposition to gasoline tax increases, or equally to the 
introduction or deepening of carbon pricing, motivated by the inequity of energy price increases. To 
be sure, to overcome this type of opposition, the distributional effects in question first need to be 
properly assessed. It will then be possible to address them through better calibrated redistributive 
measures. The relevance of our findings is further reinforced by the fact that a significant part of the 
literature draws conclusions pointing right in the opposite direction. Notably, the lifetime perspective 
taken by many empirical studies results in somewhat mitigated distributional effects, including, e.g., 
gasoline taxes turning from regressive to proportional. However, the utility of the policy implications 
that this type of result bears is questionable on different grounds. First, the lifetime perspective is 
flawed in that people make interpersonal welfare comparisons – and hence equity judgments – based 
on realised outcomes, not expectations. Welfare programs are indeed calibrated based on observed 
welfare differentials, not expected ones. Second, the strong assumptions underlying the lifetime 
approach affect the accuracy of the outcomes.  
Our analysis ultimately indicates that, by not considering wealth, the existing literature on the 
distributional incidence of gasoline taxes and of carbon pricing is biased against the regressivity of 
such policies. Greater regressivity than that emerging from this literature may help explain why equity 
concerns are such a big issue in this domain. Of course this does not make the cost-effectiveness case 
for environmental policies that raise energy prices any less powerful. It does imply, however, that 
their distributional effects should not be underestimated and that appropriate redistributive measures 
should be foreseen for the same policies to be fair and, thus, ultimately to be politically sustainable.  
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Appendix 
 
A. Propensity score matching 
Among the statistical matching methods, the literature distinguishes between parametrical and non-
parametrical approaches, both with their advantages and trade-offs. We here apply a mixed method 
which takes the best of both worlds: the parsimony of parametric methods and the robustness to 
misspecification of non-parametric techniques (D’Orazio et al., 2006). Specifically, we perform a 
propensity score matching (PSM) as described in Rässler (2002). 
Though originally developed as a method to infer causal effects (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), 
the PSM is increasingly being used to integrate pairs of datasets (Eurostat, 2013; Tedeschi and Pisano, 
2013; Kaplan and Turner, 2012; Baldini et al., 2015). The PSM procedure consists of two steps. In the 
first step, a logit (or probit) model is fitted to a binary variable, D, indicating which of the two 
datasets an observation belongs to (e.g., D = 0 if observation i belongs to the donor dataset, D = 1 if i 
is from the recipient dataset). A set of selected variables, X, which are common to both datasets, are 
used as independent variables: 
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The propensity score (PS) is the predicted probability of an observation to belong to the recipient 
dataset – the CE sample in our case – conditional on X. The second step consists in matching the 
observations according to their PS, so that each unit of the recipient dataset is paired to the 
observation in the donor dataset exhibiting the closest propensity score according to a chosen distance 
function.  
In our application, each CE observation is matched with one SCF observation. The wealth 
observed on the latter is then imputed to the former. The size of the SCF sample (30,075 observations) 
is much larger than that of our CE sample (2,179), which benefits the efficiency of the matching. 
However, due to oversampling of wealthy households in the SCF (Kennickell, 2007), we follow 
Bostic et al. (2009) in dropping the top income decile in the SCF dataset. This results in the removal 
of the top 5% wealth values (268 observations) and 3 observations with negative wealth. 
 
A.1 Selection of the matching variables  
The choice of the matching technique, such as the PSM, is only one of the steps required to integrate 
two datasets. The quality of the matching results is strongly dependent on the preliminary selection of 
the matching variables. These are a subset of the variables common to the two datasets (donor and 
recipient) selected based on both a) the similarity of their empirical distributions in the two datasets 
and b) the strength of their statistical association with the variables whose relationship is of interest, 
which are wealth and gasoline expenditure in our case. 
To verify the first requirement, the common variables need to be homogenous across datasets 
both in terms of definition and statistical content. Thus, unless they are already identically defined, 
they have to be re-coded to ensure that the information they bear is exactly the same. Table A1 lists 
the common variables that have been considered as candidate matching variables. 
 
Table A1: Common variables CE-SCF considered for statistical matching. 
Characteristics of Reference 
person and Spouse 
Marital status, Sex reference person, Sex of spouse, age of reference person, age of spouse, 
race of the Reference Person, race of spouse, education of Ref. Person, education of 
Spouse, ref. Person self-employed, Spouse self-employed. 
Economic Characteristics Family Income Before taxes, family Salaries, non-working group of ref. person 
(incnonw1_js), non-working group of spouse (incnonw2_js), hours worked in a week by 
ref., hours worked in a week by spouse, number autos,  food at home, Food away. 
House Home renter (CU tenure), Rent paid  
Household Structure Family size, number of members under 18, number of members over 64.  
 
 
As the two datasets are samples drawn from the same population, the common variables should 
be homogenous in their statistical content too. That is, they should exhibit similar marginal and 
conditional distributions (Leulescu and Agafitei, 2013). Only variables with sufficiently similar 
distributions in the two datasets can be used in the matching algorithm. Different approaches can be 
used to assess the degree of similarity between pairs of distributions, the most popular being the 
simple inspection of the frequency distributions and the more rigorous calculation of the Hellinger 
distance. The Hellinger distance (HD) ranges between 0 and 1, these extreme values corresponding to 
perfect similarity and total discrepancy, respectively. In the literature, HD = 0.05 is often taken as 
reference threshold. Figure A1 shows the HD results obtained for the CE-SCF common variables, 
while also highlighting those eventually selected as matching variables (see below). Tables comparing 
marginal and conditional distributions of the same variables across datasets are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Hellinger Distances for common variables 
 
 
 
 
The second requirement for a matching variable is to be statistically associated with both the 
variable of interest in the donor dataset, Y (wealth), and the variable of interest in the recipient 
dataset, Z (gasoline expenditure). After separately regressing Y and Z against the common variables, 
only those with sufficiently low HD (ideally below the 0.05 standard threshold) and, at the same time, 
showing significant explanatory power are selected as matching variables. To get plausible estimates 
of the (unobserved) joint distribution of Y and Z, strong explanatory power of the matching variables 
X is indeed critical18. In our application, the set of selected matching variables (i.e., those used in the 
logit model of the PSM) is narrowed down to: household income, housing tenure, age of the reference 
person, her education level, her marital status and her employer type. 
 
A.2 Matching results  
Once the matching variables have been selected, different matching algorithms can be considered. 
The choice of the matching algorithm is based on the quality of the resulting matching. This is usually 
                                                            
18
 If the matching variables have strong statistical association both with Y and Z, the fundamental assumption of 
conditional independence between Y and Z (conditional on X) is easier to hold. If so, inference concerning the 
actually unobserved association is valid (Rässler, 2004). 
assessed by three increasingly demanding criteria concerning the similarity between the distribution 
of the observed target variable (here, wealth) in the donor dataset and that of its imputed counterpart 
in the fused dataset. With reference to the target variable and the matching variables, the three criteria 
concern the preservation of i) the marginal and conditional distributions, ii) the correlation structure, 
and iii) the joint distribution (Rässler, 2004). In our application, while different matching methods 
perform similarly in terms of wealth’s marginal and conditional distributions, the Mahalanobis metric 
(Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) outperform with respect to the other two more stringent criteria. Overall, 
the quality of the matching is deemed satisfactory.  
(i) Marginal and conditional distributions 
The HD between observed wealth in the SCF dataset and imputed wealth in the fused dataset is equal 
to 0.05, indicating only a small discrepancy. Table A2 contrasts the respective marginal distributions. 
The similarity between the two distributions is also illustrated with the Q-Q plot and the histogram in 
Figure A2 (top and bottom graph, respectively). 
 
Table A2. Comparison of wealth distribution between CE and SCF after matching   
 
wealth cutoff SCF Obs. (%) CE Obs. (%) mean diff. Diff/SCF(%) 
-366360- -58,418 1,209 5.10% -59,147 74 3.40% 729 -1% 
-18550- -8,800 1,195 5.10% -8,965 92 4.20% 166 -2% 
-2420- -406 1,184 5.00% -313 102 4.70% -93 23% 
330- 1,979 1,203 5.10% 2,159 83 3.80% -180 -9% 
3810- 5,733 1,185 5.00% 5,480 95 4.40% 253 4% 
8100- 10,276 1,199 5.10% 10,234 89 4.10% 42 0% 
13260- 17,165 1,182 5.00% 17,174 97 4.50% -9 0% 
21800- 28,447 1,186 5.00% 28,109 111 5.10% 338 1% 
35790- 45,522 1,164 4.90% 45,822 119 5.50% -300 -1% 
56900- 68,947 1,178 5.00% 69,256 111 5.10% -309 0% 
82110- 97,772 1,156 4.90% 98,056 129 5.90% -284 0% 
115140- 136,502 1,149 4.90% 135,499 135 6.20% 1,003 1% 
159900- 185,634 1,162 4.90% 186,981 126 5.80% -1,347 -1% 
213600- 246,228 1,163 4.90% 248,734 120 5.50% -2,507 -1% 
282400- 331,172 1,166 5.00% 331,306 122 5.60% -134 0% 
387900- 450,216 1,167 5.00% 459,489 117 5.40% -9,273 -2% 
530800- 632,371 1,168 5.00% 629,761 120 5.50% 2,610 0% 
735250- 886,546 1,169 5.00% 876,751 117 5.40% 9,794 1% 
1063300- 1,361,926 1,163 4.90% 1,364,345 123 5.60% -2,420 0% 
1780000- 2,537,842 1,189 5.10% 2,596,898 97 4.50% -59,056 -2% 
Total   23,537 100%   2,179 100%     
 Skewness      2.7   2.72   -0.02 -1% 
 Kurtosis        10.71   11.12   -0.41 -4% 
Gini 0.75   0.72   0.03 4% 
Theil (0) 1.52   1.33   0.19 13% 
Theil (1) 0.91     0.84     0.07 8% 
Figure A2. Wealth distribution in SCF and CE 
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Figure A3 contrasts the conditional distributions of observed wealth and imputed wealth in the 
donor dataset and in the fused dataset, respectively, against some matching variables. The conditional 
distributions in the first dataset are generally well preserved in the second.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.  Conditional distribution of Wealth before and after fusion. 
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Moreover, Table A3 contrasts the composition of observed wealth and that of imputed wealth. 
Again, the main distributional characteristics are maintained after the matching. Thus, the relative 
importance of the different wealth components (as well as the respective ownership rates) is similar in 
the donor and in the fused dataset. 
 
Table A3. Wealth components in imputed CE and observed SCF 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Ownership rates 
 CE SCF CE SCF CE SCF 
Net Worth 
             217,293  100%              236,089  100%            413,974  473,921  100% 100% 
Assets               
Owner-occup. house 
             108,533  50%              140,820  60%            151,996  200,514  68% 61% 
Real estate and 
business                49,185  23%                50,803  22%            203,522  207,561  27% 30% 
Liquid assets 
               23,511  11%                25,785  11%              59,821  72,965  93% 92% 
Financial assets 
               27,502  13%                33,095  14%            113,194  147,581  33% 32% 
Retirement assets 
               54,563  25%                61,781  26%            149,937  167,384  50% 48% 
Debts 
            
  
Mortgage debt 
-              37,897  -17% -             61,870  -26%              69,117  11,398  42% 41% 
Other debt  -                8,104  -4% -              14,325  -6%              19,929           28,702  60% 63% 
Note: values with sampling weights .  a. Ownership rates refer to the percentage of households that actually own the given asset. 
 
 (ii) Correlation structure 
The second, more demanding assessment criterion concerns the preservation, after the matching, of 
the correlation structure of wealth and the matching variables. Accordingly, Table A4 contrasts the 
relevant correlation matrices in the donor dataset (observed wealth) and in the fused dataset (imputed 
wealth). No major differences are observed. 
 
Table A4. Correlation structure between common variables in both SCF and CEX after fusion 
  
Ln 
(netw.) 
Ln (F. 
Income) 
Sq. 
Income  
Self. 
Empl. 
Ref 
House 
tenure 
Age 
ref. 
sq. 
age 
ref. 
No 
school 
Some 
Coll 
Bach. 
D. Post. marit. 
ln(networth) 1.00            
ln(Family Income Before taxes) 0.59 1.00           
Squared Family Income Before taxes 0.35 0.58 1.00          
Self employed Ref. -0.10 0.18 -0.01 1.00         
House tenure -0.58 -0.32 -0.17 0.11 1.00        
Age Ref. Person 0.32 -0.02 -0.01 -0.46 -0.32 1.00       
Squared Age Ref. Person 0.29 -0.07 -0.04 -0.48 -0.29 0.98 1.00      
No school -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00     
Some College -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 1.00    
Bach. Degree 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.23 1.00   
Postgrad. 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.04 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.19 -0.21 1.00  
marital st. separated -0.15 -0.13 -0.04 0.01 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 1.00 
              
  
Ln 
(netw.) 
Ln (F. 
Income) 
Sq. 
Income  
Self. 
Empl. 
Ref 
House 
tenure 
Age 
ref. 
sq. 
age 
ref. 
No 
school 
Some 
Coll 
Bach. 
D. Post. marit. 
ln(networth) 1.00            
ln(Family Income Before taxes) 0.46 1.00           
Squared Family Income Before taxes 0.33 0.56 1.00          
Self employed Ref. -0.03 0.36 0.14 1.00         
House tenure -0.54 -0.24 -0.16 0.04 1.00        
Age Ref. Person 0.23 -0.20 -0.07 -0.54 -0.20 1.00       
Squared Age Ref. Person 0.20 -0.23 -0.10 -0.56 -0.17 0.99 1.00      
No school -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.00     
Some College -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 1.00    
Bach. Degree 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 -0.23 1.00   
Postgrad. 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.18 -0.19 1.00  
marital st. separated -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 
 
(iii) Joint distribution 
Finally, the similarity of the joint distributions of wealth and the matching variables is assessed by 
regressing observed wealth and imputed wealth, in the respective datasets, against the matching 
variables. The statistical significance of the difference between the two sets of coefficients is then 
evaluated by means of a Hausman test. Table A5 shows the estimated coefficients of the two wealth 
functions as well as the outcome of the Hausman test. With reference to the latter, both at the .01 and 
.05 significance level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are not systematically 
different. This result further validates the reliability of the matching performed.  
 
Table A5. Hausman test on wealth function between observed and fused wealth. 
Dep. Variable: ln(Wealth) (b) (B) (b-B)   
  Fused (CE) Observed (SCF) Difference S.E. 
Family Income Before taxes 0.000022 0.000021 0.000001 0.000001 
Squared Family Income Before taxes 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Self employed Ref. -0.198223 -0.162168 -0.036055 0.081554 
House tenure -1.842897 -1.721890 -0.121007 0.081784 
Age Ref. Person 0.016197 0.023399 -0.007203 0.011739 
Squared Age Ref. Person 0.000106 0.000054 0.000052 0.000106 
No school -1.943236 -0.259389 -1.683847 0.615699 
Some College 0.436587 0.380951 0.055636 0.089805 
Bach. Degree 0.744419 0.828986 -0.084567 0.089676 
Postgrad. 1.010688 0.901698 0.108991 0.107256 
marital st. separated -0.755710 -0.532961 -0.222750 0.250013 
     
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 14.390    
 Prob>chi2 0.072       
Notes:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic.    
 
 
 
 
B. Rates of return on different assets 
 
 
Table B1 . Long term average rates of return (non-home wealth) 
 Asset return rate * 
Assets  
Real estate and business 2.54 
Liquid assets 0.61 
Financial assets 3.03 
Retirement assets 2.79 
Debts  
Mortgage debt -3.81 
Other debt  -3.81 
Notes: Deflated values. These return rates consist in an updated 
version of those in Wolff and Zacharias (2009).  
 
 
 
C. More results 
 
 
Figure C1 – Changes in quintile ranking by head of household’s age group. 
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Figure C2 – Gasoline tax payments as a share of alternative ability to pay measures. 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
m
ed
ia
n
 
sh
a
re
,
 
%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A) Income
income decile
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
m
ed
ia
n
 
sh
a
re
,
 
%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
B) Tot. expend.
tot. expend. decile
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
m
ed
ia
n
 
sh
a
re
,
 
%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C) Wealth adj. income
wealth adj. income decile
Gasoline tax payments as a share of:
 
 Figure C3 – Annual gasoline expenditure per adult equivalent by head of household’s age group. 
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